A conceit is afflicting the liberal left. The once reflexive adjustments of civilizational logics, suspicions about theories of universal progress, and the disposition to challenge the Washington consensus on social, economic, and political affairs is now undergoing a steady reversal. A universalist liberal ideology has been re-asserted. It is not only neo-con hawks or Blairite opportunists that now legitimise wars for democracy. Alarmingly, it is a generation of political thinkers who opposed the Nixonian logic of war (wars to show that a country can 'credibly' fight a war to protect its interests Much horror and suffering has been unleashed on the world in the name of the liberal society which must endure. However, when suicide bombing and state-terror are compared, the retort is that there is no moral equivalence between the two. Talal Asad in * Senior Lecturer, Kent Law School, University of Kent, Canterbury, Kent CT2 7NS, UK. E-Mail: s.motha@kent.ac.uk. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Faculty of Sociology, Delhi School of Economics, Delhi, in January 2008. I benefitted enormously from questions and comments at that seminar. My special thanks to Deepak Mehta, Pratiksha Baxi, and Upendra Baxi for enriching that discussion. Brenna Bhandar, Peter Fitzpatrick, Ian Wollington, and Anastasia Vakulenko commented on earlier versions. The anonymous referees made extensive and generous suggestions for which I am very grateful. James Martel's encouraging and incisive comments were invaluable. Any errors are mine.
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-3 -between victim and perpetrator are erased. 6 In the place of ethnographically informed research the 'theorist' or 'public intellectual' erases the contingency of the suicide bomber and reduces her death to pure annihilation, or nothingness.
The discussion concludes by undoing the notion of the 'West', the very ground that the liberal left assert they stand for. The 'West' is no longer a viable representation of a geo-political convergence, if it ever was. Liberal discourse has regarded itself as the projection of the 'West' and its enlightenment. But this ignores important continuities between Islam, Christianity, and contemporary secular formations. The current 'clash of monotheisms', I argue after J-L Nancy, reveals a crisis of sense, authority, and meaning which is inherent to the monotheistic form. An increasingly globalised world is made up of political communities and juridical orders that have been 'emptied' of authority and certainty. This crisis of sense conditions the horror felt by the supposedly rational liberal in the face of Islamist terrorism. Horror at terrorism is then the affective bond that sustains a grouping that otherwise suffers the loss of a political project with a definite end.
The general objective of this essay is to challenge the unexamined assumptions "Drawing the lesson of the disastrous history of left apologetics over the crimes of Stalinism and Maoism, as well as more recent exercises in the same vein (some of the reaction to the crimes of 9/11, the excuse-making for suicide-terrorism, the disgraceful alliances lately set up inside the "anti-war" movement with illiberal theocrats), we reject the notion that there are no opponents on the Left. We reject, similarly, the idea that there can be no opening to ideas and individuals to our right. Leftists who make common cause with, or excuses for, anti-democratic forces should be criticized in clear and forthright terms. Conversely, we pay attention to liberal and conservative voices and ideas if they contribute to strengthening democratic norms and practices and to the battle for human progress". by the 1970s, not to repeat the error of blindly following a scientific discourse that promised to produce a utopia -whether this was 'actually existing socialism' or the purity of 'blood and soil'. But now, a deadly politics, a thanatopolitics, is drawn out of a liberal horror and struggle against a monolithically drawn enemy called Islamic fundamentalism.
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What is new is that Islam has replaced communism/fascism as the new 'peril' against which the full spectrum of liberalism is mobilized.
Islamist terrorism and suicide bombers, a clash between an apparently Islamic 'cult of death' versus modern secular rationality has come to be a central preoccupation of the liberal left. In the process, as Talal Asad has eloquently pointed out, horror about terrorism has come to be revealed as one way in which liberal subjectivity and its relation to political community can be interrogated and understood. The North Atlantic model of progress, like something akin to the 'white man's burden', was exported around the world through colonialism. As Berman puts it, several empires "postulated progress as its goal".
12
According to Berman, except for those colonized peoples under the yoke of the 'insane' Belgians, "a good many people among the colonized populations approved of those imperial goals, too".
13
The colonized world apparently held out the "keen and touching hope" that history's promise was not just for 
18
Led astray by postmodernist relativists, liberals, according to Cohen, were unable to take the "only moral option" of "supporting Iraqis as they struggled to establish democracy".
19
The war had a "degree of legitimacy" that liberals should have readily accepted because it involved the "overthrow of Saddam Hussein".
20
This argument appears to be saying, 'work out who your friends and enemies are', and The panacea for all these different vectors of political and cultural conflict, we are asked to believe, is universal truth, rationality and science, all mediated through democratic institutions and human rights sourced in an indefinite place called the 'West'.
The relationship between death, politics, and subjectivity appear central to many discussions which compare violence in the name of liberal democratic political formations with those apparently driven by Islam. It thus seems apt to interrogate how liberal subjectivity, human finitude, and politics cohere at the site of 'collective immortality'
22
(a notion of the public, nation, or political community). In the following section, then, I focus on the death-politics nexus in some influential studies.
23

II
Death and Politics
Berman draws a "universal mission" for the United States from Abraham Lincoln's Gettysburg Address -and places emphasis on the defence of freedom as a work of death.
According to Berman, Lincoln did not "avert his eyes from death".
24
For Lincoln, reflecting on the sacrifice of Union soldiers during the Civil War, death is the measure of commitment to liberty, equality, and self-government: "the last full measure of devotion".
25
The cultish register is at a fevered pitch as Berman, inspired by Lincoln, draws the nexus between liberalism and war: "a liberal society must be, when challenged, a warlike society, or it will not endure".
26
Much horror and suffering has been unleashed on the world in the name of the liberal society which must endure. 'Moral equivalence' is the fuzzy concept deployed if the difference between our 'good war' and their senseless cult of death is questioned. It is the thanatopolitical formations common to liberalism and Islamism that this section will explore. 21 See my discussion of the various approaches to subjectivity and subjection in the context of legal limits on 'veiling', and the unstable distinction between religion and secularism, in S. One approach is to understand death and sacrifice in the register of oppression and freedom. In his much discussed essay, "Necropolitics", Archille Mbembe treats suicide bombing in the context of a discussion about the centrality of death in modern calculations of power.
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He compares and contrasts a range of necropolitical instances such as the Holocaust of European Jews, slavery, colonialism, and apartheid South Africa.
Israel/Palestine, a contemporary formation where death, terror, and freedom are in cocirculation, is framed by Mbembe through two logics -the 'logic of survival' and the 'logic of martyrdom'. In Hegelian terms the 'survivor' is a being whose existence is characterised entirely as a victory over the other, his enemy. This, along with the 'justness' of war, legally authorises the state to deal out death. The logic of martyrdom, Mbembe says, needs to confront this distinction between form (uniformed regular or terrorist) and matter (the dealing out of death). But for Mbembe, martyrdom collapses form/matter as the suicide bomber's body becomes the uniform of the destructive device -the body is the weapon, and is thus removed from a field of power. This is tantamount to the denial of a political-death that has a temporal purchase.
Commenting on the body of the suicide bomber, Mbembe says:
The body in itself has neither power nor value. The power and value of the body result from a process of abstraction based on the desire for eternity. In that sense, the martyr, having established a moment of supremacy in which the subject overcomes his own mortality, can be seen as labouring under the sign of the future. In other words, in death the future is collapsed into the present.
32
This is a common reduction of the suicide bomber to one who seeks another-worldly immortality -an account I will return to below. On this account, the materiality of the present is overcome through a mystical association with a transcendental future. The matter of the body, or again the matter which is the body, is invested with properties that cannot be deduced from its character as a thing, but from a transcendental nomos outside it. The besieged body becomes a piece of metal whose function is, through sacrifice, to bring eternal life into being. The body duplicates itself and, in death, literally and metaphorically escapes the state of siege and occupation. and constitutive of a relation between violence, nation, and religion. The nuanced hermeneutic differences between appellations such as 'sacrifice, gift, martyrdom' tend to be ignored by commentators that want the narrative to be an assimilation of the act of the suicide bomber to the regular 'national' narratives such as the way in which we saw Berman invoke Lincoln above.
As Asad points out, the Arabic word for 'gift', hadiyya, is never used to describe sacrifice, and qurbān, the Arabic word for sacrifice is more commonly used by Arabic speaking Christians to describe communion, than by Arabic speaking Muslims to describe animal sacrifice.
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The reason the religious motivation of suicide bombing is favoured, as Asad explains, is that it combines a psychological element familiar to a criminal process, and a "cultural sign" that can distinguish 'them' from 'us'. This feeds the civilizational discourse where 'we' are committed to life, and 'they' are committed to death. Qutb insist on the revival of a 'tradition', they engage in a modern discourse of authenticity, as well as sovereignty, socialism, nationality, and rationality in order to advance their arguments in a terrain of contestation in which no 'pure' position is available.
39
This is not unlike the 'last full measure of devotion' in the sacrifice of soldiers in the name of liberty, nation, or democracy. Second, the assertion of a universalist and social logic is the better interpretation of contemporary theorists of jihad, rather than the reading of radical Islam as a 'particularism' to be contrasted to the 'universalist' West (modern, enlightened and so on). As Euben points out: "action in the name of jihad has always been, at least since the Medinan period, in the service of a universalist and universalizing political and social order".
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While this is not a justification of killings in the name of jihad, it displaces the sense that suicide bombing is a return to 'primitive tradition' or the pursuit of an 'other worldly' immortality. What is clear from this discussion are the continuities rather than differences between Islamic and so-called Western discourses in relation to death and politics. Only the western universal, refusing to recognize Islam as an alternative universal, renders it into an otherworldly quest.
It is unhelpful to orient the discussion of death and politics through apparent differences between west/east, Islamic and Christian legacies, or pre-modern and modern social and political imaginings. Euben insists that the relationship between death and worldly politics is an intimate one, and it is not only the preserve of Islamists who are read as revivers of 'pre-modern' tribalism. Christianity produces its own legion of deadly saints.
Consider the following incisive passage from Walzer, discussed by Euben:
The puritan response produced revolutionaries, that is, saints, godly magistrates, men Death, terror, and politics are a worldly pursuit of power and control. The unification of a polity under One law, the governance of a territory under One authority, the 'affective 39 Euben, "Killing (for) Politics", p. 21. 40 Euben, "Killing (for) Politics", p. 22. Without wishing to underestimate the differences between Christianity and Islam, Marinos Diamantides has explained how they both share a common reception of Greek texts, similar roles for scholars who engage in scriptural interpretation -and above all a tendency towards legalism. 43 It is then a common 'dogmatism' rather than an insuperable difference that marks their conflicts. Diamantides explains how 'law' becomes the primary expression of Islam "in a manner structurally similar to Christianity". 44 In Islam there is an attempt at Canonization -but one that ultimately fails, or at least fails to manifest itself in the form of Papal or other sovereign form which transcends local, communal, consensual interpretations of texts. What then accounts for the dis/similarities between Islam and Christianity? At the heart of this, for Diamantides, is the divergent fate of legalism in Islam and Christianity -the reception of Roman Canon law is "still born" in Islam, whereas
Christianity successfully establishes "exclusive interpretative authority" at the centre of an imperial capital. 45 Christianity evolves into the figure of what in later modernity becomes a 'sovereign authority', along with a form of subjectivization which involves "'autonomy', 'solidarity', 'reciprocity'". 46 Later this matures into a principle whereby the 'truth-seeking' autonomous individual subject is at the heart of 'Western political rationality'. 47 In Islam, in contrast, the equivalent principle is the "local community as 'collective subject'" speaking through multiple, "revered interpreters of religious law". 48 These similarities and contingent differences result in anxieties that are related to the secularization of both monotheisms.
Current Islamic politics should then be viewed, Diamantides argues, as a "secular politics with a religious cloak" -just as "western liberalism is a secular cloak for religious politics". 
III Concluding Remarks: No Place Like the 'West'
The events of September 11, 2001 start with a collision that is the symbol and symptom of a clash of monotheisms.
51
There was a correspondence between all that is symbolised through the 'World Trade Centre', God as the dollar, or in fact the God mentioned in the dollar, and Islamist terrorists who sort a worldly immortality in the name of another monotheistic God.
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In either case an instrumentalised God is presented as a source of absolute value. The reaction that took the name 'war on terror' became the site for a liberal deployment of yet more absolutes -civilizational divisions, secular pretentions, and extraordinary renditions. But this post 9/11 world, as it has come to be called, seems to reiterate a formulation that no longer seems possible precisely because the world has become global. Is there not a 'third world' in the 'first', or elements in the global south that There is a global crisis of 'value' -as Nancy has put it.
56
The liberal left response to this should have involved an urgent rethinking of the substitutes for transcendent value, national sovereignty, for instance, which has been such a corrupting ground for internationalism. Imagining the world as a 'secularization' of the Christian 'created world', or 'fallen world' is no longer adequate. The identification of an immanent principle or end -that is, a cause or telos for this world from this world -has been the site of many disasters. The question of the 'world' was mainly approached as a question of 'value' -that is, whether
God, humanity, property, labour, nation will be the source of value. The modern problem has been to cope with the dissipation of an available source of sense outside the worldto explain the immanent sense of the world. Whether this was to be from humanity, the use or exchange value of labour, the political theologies of 'blood and soil', nation or people, have been symptomatic of the struggle for sense. What Nancy has suggested is that the problem of 'world' must now be confronted beyond the traditions of monotheism, including secularised onto-theological forms. As value becomes immanent to the world, the 'creation' of the world is displaced into the "without-reason" of the world: "and this displacement is not a transposition, a 'secularization' of the onto-theological or metaphysical-Christian scheme: it is, rather, its deconstruction and emptying out, and it opens onto another space -of place and of risk -which we have just begun to enter".
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Permit me to explain this further -though only as a preliminary opening to future engagements and elaborations.
Recourse to the 'West', 'Europe', 'enlightenment values', without further exploration of their discontinuous trajectories reveals that there is a break-down of meaning -an inability to make sense of contemporary events other than by reaching for an old 'certainty'
that was never present to itself. Nancy has explained that this breakdown of meaning must be understood within the tradition of 'monotheism' itself. Monotheism is anti-religious -and that fate haunts all peoples drawing their traditions from the three Religions of the Book. What is meant by 'monotheism is anti-religious'? At stake in the 'mono-' of monotheism is not only a distinction with 'polytheism', but also the potential abandonment that might by wrought by a jealous God whose 'people' cannot be certain of their fate.
There is no guarantee that through means of sacrifice, or by calling on 'Him' to be good to 'His people', that this all powerful God will bestow goodwill. As Nancy explains:
Monotheism, in its first principles, undoes theism, that is to say the presence of a power that assembles the world and guarantees its meaning. It thus makes the name of 'god' absolutely problematic -it makes it nonsignificant -and above all it takes away from it all 57 Jean-Luc Nancy, The Creation of the World or Globalisation (Albany, SUNY Press, 2007) p. 51.
power to guarantee. The Christian guarantee can only take place at the price of a category that is completely opposed to that of religious belief: the category of 'faith', which is loyalty to an absence and the certainty of this loyalty in the absence of any guarantee". 58 The absence of a power that can guarantee meaning -that is our present condition. But this absence also marks the auto-deconstructive potential of monotheism. In this condition, Man is placed at the centre of deciphering the meaning of the essence of Godthat is, monotheism becomes demythologised, and thus less religious. Christianity in particular becomes auto-interpretative: "a symbolic order deciphered in the human condition (man's reason, his freedom, his dignity, his relations with others …)". The monotheistic attachments of such discourses carry many dangers. But exploring and critically interrogating them is an urgent task that follows from this discussion.
